International law and domestic institutions: reconciling North American “unfair” trade laws
While scholars have written much about the role played by international institutions in cooperative behavior among nations, they have not examined the domestic political motives that may lie behind nations' decisions to join such organizations. Two-level games analysis provides a framework for studying domestic politics not as a constraint upon nations that enter into international agreements but as a catalyst for nations to enter into agreements. The dispute settlement procedures of the North American Free Trade Agreement and its predecessor, the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, offer an empirical illustration of this point.
Year of publication: |
1996
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Authors: | Goldstein, Judith |
Published in: |
International Organization. - Cambridge University Press. - Vol. 50.1996, 04, p. 541-564
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Publisher: |
Cambridge University Press |
Description of contents: | Abstract [journals.cambridge.org] |
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