Interval Game Theoretic Division Rules

Interval bankruptcy problems arise in situations where an estate has to be liquidated among a fixed number of creditors and uncertainty about the amounts of the estate and the claims is modeled by intervals. We extend in the interval setting the classic results by Curiel, Maschler and Tijs (Bankruptcy games, Zeitschrift fuer Operations Research, 31 (1987), A 143 - A 159) that characterize division rules which are solutions of the cooperative bankruptcy game

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Year of publication:	[2008]
Authors:	Branzei, Rodica
Other Persons:	Dall'Aglio, Marco (contributor) ; Tijs, Stef H. (contributor)
Publisher:	[2008]: [S.l.] : SSRN

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (19 p)
Series:	CentER Discussion Paper Series ; No. 2008-97
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments November 7, 2008 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.1313613 [DOI]
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012722399