Introduction: Ex Uno Plures. Welfare Without Illusion
Abstract Two competing visions of federalism have long held sway. The first is centered on the idea of an administrative system of delegation based on a geographic partitioning of the polity. The second view sees federalism as a bottom-up structure in which the larger polity is a construct of the smaller polities of which it is composed. In this edited collection, the object is to use these rival visions of a federal structure as a lens through which to analyze the various interconnections between the welfare state and its financing. Specifically, the claim is that the effects of federalism cannot be fully understood without consideration of the vision of federalism that the participants in their various roles adopt. The works collected in this special issue represent a selection of the papers presented at the conference “Ex Uno Plures. Welfare without Illusion,” held in September 2009 at the Faculty of Economics of Sapienza University of Rome, Italy, organized by the European Center for the Study of Public Choice (ECSPC).
Year of publication: |
2010
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Authors: | Brennan, Geoffrey ; Eusepi, Giuseppe |
Published in: |
Review of Law & Economics. - De Gruyter, ISSN 1555-5879, ZDB-ID 2191851-X. - Vol. 6.2010, 3, p. 325-328
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Publisher: |
De Gruyter |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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