Introduction to the Symposium on Rights-Based Fisheries Management
Increasing levels of fisheries collapse are now widely believed to be the consequence of ineffective centralized management of the common pool. In theory, realigning incentives for ecologically sustainable and economically prosperous fisheries requires assigning property rights to the resource, which will then encourage owners to internalize the effects on sustainability of current resource management decisions. In fisheries, property rights can be assigned in a variety of ways, including rights to harvest a certain fraction of the allowable catch (individual transferable quotas, ITQs), rights to exclusive harvest within a given geographic region (territorial use rights fisheries, TURFs), and rights to manage a resource stock collaboratively through a group with well-defined membership (cooperatives). The relative performance of each of these approaches will, at least in principle, depend on the specifics of the fishery in question, suggesting that correctly designing property rights institutions to match the fishery context is crucial to success. Copyright 2012, Oxford University Press.
Year of publication: |
2012
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Authors: | Costello, Christopher |
Published in: |
Review of Environmental Economics and Policy. - Association of Environmental and Resource Economists - AERE, ISSN 1750-6816. - Vol. 6.2012, 2, p. 212-216
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Publisher: |
Association of Environmental and Resource Economists - AERE |
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