Inventory in Vertical Relationships with Private Information and Interdependent Values
We study the use of inventory when a distributor is better informed about demand than a manufacturer. We find that when distributor and manufacturer values are interdependent it is optimal to endow the distributor with some inventory before it obtains its private information. We characterize the final allocation of the good and show that the distributor may have too few (many) units relative to the efficient allocation when demand is high (low).
Year of publication: |
2010
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Authors: | Anton, James J. ; Biglaiser, Gary ; Lewis, Tracy |
Institutions: | Duke University, Department of Economics |
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