Investment decisions under hidden competition

We present a model adequate for investment decisions in duopolies under total hidden competition. In this competitive context all potential entrants remain unrevealed until they decide to move into the market. The value-functions and the optimal entry thresholds are derived.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Pereira, Paulo J. ; Armada, Manuel Rocha
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 121.2013, 2, p. 228-231
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Hidden competition \| Duopolies \| Real options

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	G31 - Capital Budgeting; Investment Policy ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010709079