Investment in the Absence of Property Rights : The Role of Incumbency Advantages

In many situations the individuals who can generate some output must enter a contest for appropriating this output. This paper analyses the investment incentives of such agents and the role of incumbency advantages in the contest. Depending on the advantages, an increase in the productivity of the investment can decrease or increase the amount of investment. The results are applied to autocrats' investment behavior and job specific investment in organizations

MoreLess

Year of publication:	[2021]
Authors:	Konrad, Kai A.
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Investition \| Investment \| Sachenrecht \| Law of property \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Anreiz \| Incentives \| Betriebliche Investitionstheorie \| Corporate investment theory

freely available

Full text |

More access options

doi.org

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (22 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments April 2002 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.311964 [DOI]
Classification:	D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances ; H54 - Infrastructures; Other Public Investment and Capital Stock ; O10 - Economic Development. General ; P16 - Political Economy
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013320550