Investment subsidies and Time-Consistent Environmental Policy
We describe a model of dynamic pollution abatement choices with heterogeneous agents where, due to the presence of a distributional objective and to the absence of incentive-compatible compensation mechanisms, the choice of a second-best level of emission taxation is time-inconsistent. In this model, we investigate whether investment subsidies can act as a substitute for policy commitment. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.
Year of publication: |
2002
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Authors: | Abrego, Lisandro ; Perroni, Carlo |
Published in: |
Oxford Economic Papers. - Oxford University Press. - Vol. 54.2002, 4, p. 617-635
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Publisher: |
Oxford University Press |
Saved in:
Saved in favorites
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