Investor Protection and Equity Markets

Andrei Shleifer, Daniel Wolfenson

We present a simple model of an entrepreneur going public in an environment with poor legal protection of outside shareholders. The model incorporates elements of Becker's (1968) crime and punishment' framework into a corporate finance environment of Jensen and Meckling (1976). We examine the entrepreneur's decision and the market equilibrium. The model is consistent with a number of empirical regularities concerning the relationship between investor protection and corporate finance

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Year of publication:	October 2000
Authors:	Shleifer, Andrei
Other Persons:	Wolfenson, Daniel (contributor)
Institutions:	National Bureau of Economic Research (contributor)
Publisher:	Cambridge, Mass : National Bureau of Economic Research
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Anlegerschutz \| Investor protection \| Aktienmarkt \| Stock market \| Börsengang \| Initial public offering

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Series:	NBER working paper series ; no. w7974
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Mode of access: World Wide Web System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers.
Other identifiers:	10.3386/w7974 [DOI]
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

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