Is executive compensation a substitute governance mechanism to debt financing and leasing?
Marizah Minhat and Nazam Dzolkarnaini
| Year of publication: |
March 2016
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Minhat, Marizah ; Dzolkarnaini, Nazam |
| Published in: |
Applied economics. - Abingdon : Routledge, ISSN 0003-6846, ZDB-ID 280176-0. - Vol. 48.2016, 13/15, p. 1293-1302
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| Subject: | Executive compensation | CEO pay | CEO incentives | capital structure | debt | leasing | corporate governance | Führungskräfte | Managers | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Managervergütung | Kapitalstruktur | Capital structure | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Leasing | Fremdkapital | Debt financing | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1080/00036846.2015.1100247 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011433144