Is it better to govern managers via agency or stewardship? : examining asymmetries by family versus nonfamily affiliation
Albert E. James, Jennifer E. Jennings, and P. Devereaux Jennings
| Year of publication: |
September 2017
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| Authors: | James, Albert E. ; Jennings, Jennifer E. ; Jennings, P. Devereaux |
| Published in: |
Family business review : journal of the Family Firm Institute. - Thousand Oaks, Calif. [u.a.] : Sage, ISSN 0894-4865, ZDB-ID 1129435-8. - Vol. 30.2017, 3, p. 262-283
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| Subject: | family firm governance | agency theory | stewardship theory | family and nonfamily managers | bifurcation bias | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Familienunternehmen | Family business | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Unternehmenserfolg | Firm performance |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1177/0894486517717532 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011744185