Is New Governance the Ideal Architecture for Global Financial Regulation?

A central challenge for international financial regulatory systems today is how to manage the impact of Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions (G-SIFIs) on the global economy, given the interconnected and pluralistic nature of regulatory regimes. This article focuses on the Financial Stability Board (FSB), and proposes a new research agenda regarding the FSBfs emerging regulatory forms. In particular, it examines the regulatory architecture of New Governance (NG), a variety of approaches that are supposed to be more reflexive, collaborative, and experimental than traditional forms of governance. A preliminary conclusion is that NG tools may be effective in resolving some kinds of problems in a pluralistic regulatory order, but they are unlikely to be suitable to all problems. As such, this article proposes that analyses of the precise conditions in which NG mechanisms may or may not be effective are necessary. It concludes with some recommendations for improving the NG model.