Is Shapley cost sharing optimal?
Year of publication: |
March 2018
|
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Authors: | Dobzinski, Shahar ; Mehta, Aranyak ; Roughgarden, Tim ; Sundararajan, Mukund |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 108.2018, p. 130-138
|
Subject: | Approximate efficiency | Cost-sharing mechanisms | Shapley value | Shapley-Wert | Kooperatives Spiel | Cooperative game | Theorie | Theory | Transferierbarer Nutzen | Transferable utility | Selbstbeteiligung | Deductible | Kosten | Costs |
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