Is Tax Reform in the Public Interest? a Rent-Seeking Perspective
This article argues that rent-seeking competition over tax reform can exhaust prospective efficiency gains, thus making tax reform a potential negative-sum activity—especially when considered over the entire rent-seeking cycle. It concludes that a positive defense against negative-sum tax reform games can arise from public choice economists debunking the game's ideological basis and constructing "rent-seeking impact statements" for proposed tax reforms.
Year of publication: |
1994
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Authors: | Vanssay, Xavier de ; Spindler, Zane A. |
Published in: |
Public Finance Review. - Vol. 22.1994, 1, p. 3-21
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Saved in:
Online Resource
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