Is there Discretion in Wage Setting? A Test Using Takeover Legislation.

In this paper, we use states' passage of anti-takeover legislation as a source of such independent variation. Passed in the 1980s, these laws serioulsy limited takeovers of firms incorporated in legislating states. Since many view hostile takeovers as an important disciplining device, these laws potentially raised managerial discretion in affected firms. If uncontrolled managers pay higher wages, we expect wages to rise following these laws.

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Year of publication:	1998
Authors:	Bertrand, M. ; Mullainathan, S.
Institutions:	Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University
Subject:	WAGES \| MANAGEMENT \| BUSINESS FINANCING

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Series:	Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	37 pages
Classification:	J30 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs. General ; M12 - Personnel Management ; G30 - Corporate Finance and Governance. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005631197