It's Now or Never: Deadlines and Cooperation
Cooperation among opportunistic agents often breaks down when agents cannot observe one another's actions. The standard remedy for such a problem is a two-mode approach pioneered by Green and Porter (1984), where agents switch back and forth between cooperation and punishment mode. Here, I consider use of a deadline as an alternative. I find that, under certain conditions, imposing a deadline can induce cooperation with unobservable actions and that the optimal deadline can pay off dominates the optimal two-mode strategy.
Year of publication: |
2011-02
|
---|---|
Authors: | Miyagiwa, Kaz |
Institutions: | Department of Economics, Emory University |
Saved in:
freely available
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
The Welfare Effect of International Cost Harmonization
Creane, Anthony, (2011)
-
The Duration of Research Joint Ventures: Theory and Evidence from the Eureka Program
Miyagiwa, Kaz, (2011)
-
Exporting Versus Foreign Direct Investment: Learning through Propinquity
Creane, Anthony, (2010)
- More ...