Jeux évolutionnistes, processus d'apprentissage et équilibres stochastiques une application à l'économie des conventions chez Hayek

This article deals with the genesis and dynamics of conventions in Hayek. It uses the theory of evolutionary games to develop a general model of learning by the agents. It also aims at giving an economic interpretation of the process by which the norms are generated and selected.

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Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Aimar, Thierry ; Bismans, Francis
Published in:	Revue d'économie politique. - Dalloz. - Vol. 116.2006, 5, p. 633-656
Publisher:	Dalloz
Subject:	austrian school of economics \| conventions \| evolutionary games \| Hayek \| institutions \| learning \| stochastically stable equilibria

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Extent:	application/pdf text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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