Job Security and Labour Market Flexibility
This paper discusses the desirability of government-legislated job security. Job security may be beneficial to employed workers, but it can also impose a cost on unemployed workers by lowering labour market turnover and thereby increasing the average duration of unemployment spells. This externality can lead to self-reinforcing behaviour between workers at different firms: If most workers in the economy have job security then turnover will be low and the duration of unemployment following a layoff is likely to be high. As a result, other workers will also desire job security. Even in the absence of legislation, therefore, the externality may result in more job security being provided than is socially desirable.
Year of publication: |
1995
|
---|---|
Authors: | Hogan, Seamus ; Ragan, Christopher |
Published in: |
Canadian Public Policy. - University of Toronto Press. - Vol. 21.1995, 2, p. 174-186
|
Publisher: |
University of Toronto Press |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Job security with equilibrium unemployment
Hogan, Seamus, (1998)
-
Employment Adjustment versus Hours Adjustment: Is Job Security Desirable?
Hogan, Seamus, (1995)
-
Is There Compelling Evidence against Increasing Returns to Matching in the Labour Market?
Baker, Simon, (1996)
- More ...