Judge:Don't Vote!

This article explains why the traditional model of the theory of social choice misrepresents reality, it cannot lead to acceptable methods of ranking and electing in any case, and a more realistic model leads inevitably to one method of ranking and electing—majority judgment—that best meets the traditional criteria of what constitutes a good method.

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Year of publication:	2010-11-18
Authors:	Balinski, Michel ; Laraki, Rida
Institutions:	HAL
Subject:	Arrow's paradox \| Condorcet's paradox \| Majority judgment \| Skating \| Social choice \| Strategic manipulation \| Voting

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00536968/en/
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008793943