Justified communication equilibrium
Year of publication: |
2021
|
---|---|
Authors: | Clark, Daniel ; Fudenberg, Drew |
Published in: |
American economic review. - Nashville, Tenn. : AEA, ISSN 1944-7981, ZDB-ID 2009979-4. - Vol. 111.2021, 9, p. 3004-3034
|
Subject: | Cheap Talk | Cheap talk | Signalling | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Kommunikation | Communication |
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