K-price auctions: Revenue inequalities, utility equivalence, and competition in auction design

This paper discusses revenue inequalities, utility equivalence, and a model of competition in auction design in symmetric equilibrium of k-price auctions, <InlineEquation ID="Equ1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$k\ge 1$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation>, all in the setup of symmetric independent-private-value auctions. Our recommendation to organizers of auctions is to conduct k-price auctions, <InlineEquation ID="Equ2"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$k\ge 3$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> in environments in which buyers are risk-seeking. The recommendation is given both for, a setup in which each organizer is a monopolist, and for one of oligopolistic competition. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004