Keeping the listener engaged : a dynamic model of Bayesian persuasion
Year of publication: |
2023
|
---|---|
Authors: | Che, Yeon-Koo ; Kim, Kyungmin ; Mierendorff, Konrad |
Published in: |
Journal of political economy. - Chicago, Ill. : Univ. of Chicago Press, ISSN 1537-534X, ZDB-ID 2010434-0. - Vol. 131.2023, 7, p. 1797-1844
|
Subject: | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Kommunikation | Communication | Informationskosten | Information costs | Dynamisches Spiel | Dynamic game | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Folk-Theorem | Folk theorem |
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