Keeping their cards close to their chests : how non-delegating CEOs avoid forced career ends
Year of publication: |
March/April 2017
|
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Authors: | Oehmichen, Jana ; Schult, Alexander ; Wolff, Michael |
Published in: |
Human resource management. - Hoboken, NJ : Wiley, ISSN 0090-4848, ZDB-ID 83105-0. - Vol. 56.2017, 2, p. 225-242
|
Subject: | CEO dismissal | delegation | agency theory | resource-based view | information-based entrenchment | information asymmetry | functional responsibilities | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Führungskräfte | Managers | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Ressourcenorientierter Ansatz | Resource-based view | Unternehmenserfolg | Firm performance | Karriereplanung | Career development | Kündigung | Dismissal | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance |
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