Kidney exchange: An egalitarian mechanism
Kidney exchange programs utilize both deceased-donor and live-donor kidneys. One of these programs, a two-way kidney paired donation (KPD), involves two patients exchanging their live donors[modifier letter apostrophe] kidneys. Another possibility is a list exchange (LE): a living incompatible donor provides a kidney to a candidate on the deceased-donor waitlist and in return the intended recipient of this donor receives a priority on the waitlist. By taking into consideration the fact that transplants from live donors have a higher chance of success than those from cadavers, we characterize the set of efficient and egalitarian exchanges involving the KPD[modifier letter apostrophe]s and LE[modifier letter apostrophe]s.
Year of publication: |
2011
|
---|---|
Authors: | YIlmaz, Özgür |
Published in: |
Journal of Economic Theory. - Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531. - Vol. 146.2011, 2, p. 592-618
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Mechanism design Matching Kidney exchange Random assignment Lorenz dominance |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
School choice under partial fairness
Dur, Umut Mert, (2019)
-
School choice under partial fairness
Dur, Umut, (2019)
-
Utility representation of lower separable preferences
Yılmaz, Özgür, (2008)
- More ...