L'impact du vote avec les pieds sur le barème d'imposition optimale du revenu. Une illustration sur données françaises

What is the impact of the threat of migration for tax purposes on the optimum redistributive policy of a country which aims at preventing emigration of highly skilled individuals ? We use the theory of optimum income taxation à la Mirrlees [1971] to answer this question. The world consists of two countries, a redistributive country A and a laissez-faire country B. The agents living in A emigrate to B if they obtain in the latter a greater utility level, taking migration costs into account. We assume that there is no income-effect on labour supply. After having extended Diamond?s [1998] formula, we present simulation results concerning the optimal income tax schedule in France when agents vote with their feet. The optimum allocation is characterised by a curse of the middle-skilled workers and an upper bound on the average tax rate which depends on gross income. Classification JEL : H21, F22