La riservatezza del banchiere centrale è un bene o un male?
Year of publication: |
1996
|
---|---|
Authors: | D'Amato, Marcello |
Other Persons: | Pistoresi, Barbara (contributor) |
Published in: |
Politica economica : rivista di studi e ricerche per la politica economica. - Bologna : Società Editrice il Mulino, ISSN 1120-9496, ZDB-ID 852320-4. - Vol. 12.1996, 3, p. 363-389
|
Subject: | Zentralbank | Central bank | Geheimhaltung | Secrecy | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Wohlfahrtsökonomik | Welfare economics | Theorie | Theory |
-
When do central banks prefer to intervene secretly?
Ferré, Montserrat, (2009)
-
Model of corporate intelligence, secrecy, and economic growth
Parello, Carmelo Pierpaolo, (2015)
-
Political pressures and monetary mystique
Geraats, Petra M., (2007)
- More ...
-
D'Amato, Marcello, (1996)
-
On the determinants of Central Bank independence in open economies
D'Amato, Marcello, (2009)
-
Modelling wage growth dynamics in Italy, 1960 - 90
D'Amato, Marcello, (1996)
- More ...