Laissez-faire, Kooperation oder Alleingang: Klimapolitik in der Schweiz
Today it seems neither economically and ecologically efficient, if Switzerland reduces its carbon-dioxide (C02) emissions in a national solo-run. But calculations from a dynamic general equilibrium analysis show: If at high probability an international agreement on C02 reductions will be established in the future, then it is economically rational, to start today a moderate climate policy in Switzerland. On the one hand, at the beginning economic costs of a solo-run are not higher than the costs of participating in an international climate program. On the other hand, only the solo-run provides an economic incentive which is strong enough such that existing technologies and structure will be replaced by less emitting and more efficient ones.
Year of publication: |
1995
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Authors: | Stephan, Gunter ; Imboden, Damian |
Published in: |
Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES). - Schweizerische Gesellschaft für Volkswirtschaft und Statistik / Société Suisse d"Économie et de Statistique - SGVS/SSES, ISSN 0303-9692. - Vol. 131.1995, II, p. 203-226
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Publisher: |
Schweizerische Gesellschaft für Volkswirtschaft und Statistik / Société Suisse d"Économie et de Statistique - SGVS/SSES |
Saved in:
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