Large contests without single crossing
Year of publication: |
2022
|
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Authors: | Olszewski, Wojciech ; Siegel, Ron |
Published in: |
Economic theory. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1432-0479, ZDB-ID 1398355-6. - Vol. 74.2022, 4, p. 1043-1055
|
Subject: | All-pay auctions | Asymmetric contests | Large games | Mechanism design | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Wettbewerb | Competition | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium |
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