Large economies and two-player games
We characterize the core and the competitive allocations of a continuum economy as strong Nash equilibria of an associated game with only two players.
Year of publication: |
2009
|
---|---|
Authors: | Hervés-Beloso, Carlos ; Moreno-García, Emma |
Published in: |
Journal of Mathematical Economics. - Elsevier, ISSN 0304-4068. - Vol. 45.2009, 9-10, p. 603-608
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Competitive equilibrium Nash equilibrium Aubin veto Core-Walras equivalence Strong Nash equilibrium |
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