Large random matching markets with localized preference structures can exhibit large cores
Year of publication: |
2024
|
---|---|
Authors: | Rheingans-Yoo, Ross |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 1090-2473, ZDB-ID 1467668-0. - Vol. 144.2024, p. 71-83
|
Subject: | Incentives | Large markets | Matching | Marktmechanismus | Market mechanism | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences | Core | Marktstruktur | Market structure |
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