Large Shareholders and Banks: Who Monitors and How?
Using a sample of Japanese firms in the chemical industry, we show that concentrated shareholding is associated with lower expenditure on activities with scope for managerial private benefits. We interpret this as evidence of a hitherto undocumented form of monitoring by large shareholders. We examine whether such monitoring is also performed by banks and other creditors. The results in the metal product industry are roughly similar, but we find no evidence of this type of monitoring in the Japanese electronics industry, and suggest a number of explanations. Copyright Royal Economic Society 2003.
Year of publication: |
2003
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Authors: | Yafeh, Yishay ; Yosha, Oved |
Published in: |
Economic Journal. - Royal Economic Society - RES, ISSN 1468-0297. - Vol. 113.2003, 484, p. 128-146
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Publisher: |
Royal Economic Society - RES |
Saved in:
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