Leader, Protester, Enabler, Spoiler: Aid Strategies and Donor Politics in Institutional Assistance
type="main"> <p>Aid co-ordination has come to be seen as a miracle cure for the ills of donor proliferation. However, in weak states where aid conditionality may be a catalyst for institutional change, the ideal of aid co-ordination is conceptually suspect, and in some instances politically counterproductive. Co-ordination is one of the two solutions to the collective-action problem that the public good of effective institutional conditionality generates; donor leadership is the other. The desirability of each solution depends on every donor's commitment and presence, which together generate a four-fold typology: leader, protester, enabler, and spoiler. As long as there is at least one enabler or spoiler donor present, aid co-ordination will be less effective than donor leadership.
Year of publication: |
2014
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Authors: | Yanguas, Pablo |
Published in: |
Development Policy Review. - Overseas Development Institute. - Vol. 32.2014, 3, p. 299-312
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Publisher: |
Overseas Development Institute |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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