Leadership, cheap talk and really cheap talk
Previous research offers compelling evidence that leaders suffice to effect efficiency-enhancements on cooperation, yet the source of this effect remains unclear. To investigate whether leadership effects can be attributed exclusively to the common information that leaders provide to a group, irrespective of the source of that information, we design a public goods game in which non-binding contribution suggestions originate with either a human or computer leader. We find that group members' decisions are significantly influenced by human leaders' non-binding contribution suggestions, both when the leader is elected as well as when the leader is randomly chosen. A leader's suggestion becomes an upper bound for group member's contributions. Identical suggestions do not impact the group members' decisions when they originate with a computer, thus supporting to the view that information provided by human leaders is uniquely able to establish welfare-enhancing norms.
Year of publication: |
2011
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Authors: | Levy, David M. ; Padgitt, Kail ; Peart, Sandra J. ; Houser, Daniel ; Xiao, Erte |
Published in: |
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. - Elsevier, ISSN 0167-2681. - Vol. 77.2011, 1, p. 40-52
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Saved in:
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