Leading with(out) sacrifice? A public-goods experiment with a super-additive player

We analyse two team settings in which one member in a team has stronger incentives to contribute than the others. If contributions constitute a sacrifice for the strong player, the other team members are more inclined to cooperate than if contributions are strictly dominant for the strong player.

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Glöckner, Andreas ; Irlenbusch, Bernd ; Kube, Sebastian ; Nicklisch, Andreas ; Normann, Hans-Theo
Publisher:	Bonn : Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Subject:	Gruppenarbeit \| Öffentliches Gut \| Spieltheorie \| Führungspersönlichkeit \| Reziprozität \| Test \| Experiments \| Leadership \| Reciprocity \| Voluntary Contribution Mechanism

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Series:	Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; 2009,8
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	605794790 [GVK] hdl:10419/32201 [Handle]
Classification:	C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; C92 - Laboratory; Group Behavior ; H40 - Publicly Provided Goods. General ; H41 - Public Goods
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266960