Learning, Public Good Provision, and the Information Trap

We consider an economy where decision maker(s) do not know the true production function for a public good. By using Bayes rule they can learn from experience. We show that the economy may learn the truth, but that it may also converge to an inefficient policy where no further inference is possible so that the economy is stuck in an information trap. We also show that our results are robust with respect to experimentation

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Year of publication:	[2008]
Authors:	Berentsen, Aleksander
Other Persons:	Bruegger, Esther (contributor) ; Loertscher, Simon (contributor)
Publisher:	[2008]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Öffentliche Güter \| Public goods \| Theorie \| Theory \| Lernprozess \| Learning process \| Bayes-Statistik \| Bayesian inference \| Staatsquote \| Government size

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (31 p)
Series:	University of Zurich, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics Working Paper ; No. 371
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments May 2008 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.1133382 [DOI]
Classification:	D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; H10 - Structure and Scope of Government. General ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012724348