Learning Standards of Social Behaviour in a Stationary Society.

In this paper I propose a general model of repeated strategic interaction with possibly private information, which is particulary suitable to study learning processes.

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Year of publication:	1996
Authors:	Gilli, M.
Institutions:	Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge
Subject:	INFORMATION \| GAME THEORY

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Series:	Cambridge Working Papers in Economics.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	38 pages
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; C11 - Bayesian Analysis ; C19 - Econometric and Statistical Methods: General. Other
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005647492