Legal effort and optimal legal expenses insurance
Year of publication: |
2013
|
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Authors: | Qiao, Yue |
Published in: |
Economic modelling. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0264-9993, ZDB-ID 86824-3. - Vol. 32.2013, p. 179-189
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Subject: | Insurance | Moral hazard | Legal effort | Conditional fee | Optimal contracts | Moral Hazard | Rechtsökonomik | Economic analysis of law | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Versicherung | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory |
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