Legislative Bargaining under Weighted Voting
Organizations often distribute resources through weighted voting. We analyze this setting using a noncooperative bargaining game based on the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model. Unlike analyses derived from cooperative game theory, we find that each voter's expected payoff is proportional to her voting weight. An exception occurs when many high-weight voters exist, as low-weight voters may expect disproportionately high payoffs due to proposal power. The model also predicts that, ex post, the coalition formateur (the party chosen to form a coalition) will receive a disproportionately high payoff. Using data from coalition governments from 1946 to 2001, we find strong evidence of such formateur effects.
Year of publication: |
2005
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Authors: | James M. Snyder Jr. ; Ting, Michael M. ; Ansolabehere, Stephen |
Published in: |
American Economic Review. - American Economic Association - AEA. - Vol. 95.2005, 4, p. 981-1004
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Publisher: |
American Economic Association - AEA |
Saved in:
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