Leniency can increase deterrence
Year of publication: |
2019
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Authors: | Lundberg, Alexander |
Published in: |
International review of law and economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0144-8188, ZDB-ID 704902-X. - Vol. 60.2019, p. 1-5
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Subject: | Crime | Deterrence | Law enforcement | Leniency | Police discretion | Rechtsdurchsetzung | Polizei | Police | Kriminalpolitik | Criminal policy | Kriminalität | Straffreiheit | Exemption from punishment | Kriminalitätsökonomik | Economics of crime | Strafe | Punishment | Kartellrecht | Antitrust law | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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