Less fighting than expected: experiments with wars of attrition and all-pay auctions

We use experiments to compare dynamic and static wars of attrition (i.e. second-price all-pay auctions) and first-price all-pay auctions. Many other studies find overbidding in first-price all-pay auctions. We can replicate this property. In wars of attrition, however, we find systematic underbidding. We study bids and revenue in different experimental frames and matching procedures and draw a link to the literature on stepwise linear bidding functions.

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Year of publication:	2007
Authors:	Hoerisch, Hannah ; Kirchkamp, Oliver
Publisher:	Jena : Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
Subject:	Auktionstheorie \| Test \| War of attrition \| dynamic bidding \| all-pay auction \| stabilisation \| volunteers dilemma \| experiment

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Series:	Jena Economic Research Papers ; 2008,023
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	560544278 [GVK] hdl:10419/25707 [Handle]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C92 - Laboratory; Group Behavior ; D44 - Auctions ; E62 - Fiscal Policy; Public Expenditures, Investment, and Finance; Taxation ; H30 - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents. General
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263871