Leverage, CEO risk-taking incentives, and bank failure during the 2007-10 financial crisis
Year of publication: |
2018
|
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Authors: | Boyallian, Patricia ; Ruiz-Verdú, Pablo |
Published in: |
Review of finance : journal of the European Finance Association. - Oxford : Oxford Univ. Press, ISSN 1572-3097, ZDB-ID 2145284-2. - Vol. 22.2018, 5, p. 1763-1805
|
Subject: | Executive compensation | Risk-taking incentives | Leverage | Banks | Financial crisis | Finanzkrise | Führungskräfte | Managers | Bankinsolvenz | Bank failure | Managervergütung | Bankrisiko | Bank risk | Risikopräferenz | Risk attitude | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive |
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