Leveraged buy out : does the arrival of new targets increase the agents' incentives?
Year of publication: |
2012
|
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Authors: | Yousfi, Ouidad |
Published in: |
Journal of economic research. - Seoul, ISSN 1226-4261, ZDB-ID 1409101-X. - Vol. 17.2012, 2 (31.8.), p. 99-137
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Subject: | Akquisitionsfinanzierung | Takeover financing | Anreiz | Incentives | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Kapitalstruktur | Capital structure | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Theorie | Theory |
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