Liability insurance : equilibrium contracts under monopoly and competition
Year of publication: |
2021
|
---|---|
Authors: | Lemus, Jorge A. ; Temnyalov, Emil ; Turner, John L. |
Published in: |
American economic journal. - Nashville, Tenn. : American Economic Association, ISSN 1945-7685, ZDB-ID 2452644-7. - Vol. 13.2021, 1, p. 83-115
|
Subject: | Haftpflichtversicherung | Liability insurance | Theorie | Theory | Monopol | Monopoly | Wettbewerb | Competition | Vertrag | Contract | Haftung | Liability | Versicherungsmarkt | Insurance market | Marktstruktur | Market structure |
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