Liars never prosper? : How management misrepresentation reduces monitoring costs
Year of publication: |
1997
|
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Authors: | Persons, John C. |
Published in: |
Journal of financial intermediation. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 1042-9573, ZDB-ID 1053781-8. - Vol. 6.1997, 4, p. 269-306
|
Subject: | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Leistungsbeurteilung | Employee performance appraisal | Kosten | Costs | Glaubwürdigkeit | Credibility | Theorie | Theory |
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