Licensing process innovations when losers' messages determine royalty rates
Year of publication: |
2013
|
---|---|
Authors: | Fan, Cuihong ; Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn ; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 82.2013, p. 388-402
|
Subject: | Patents | Licensing | Auctions | Royalty | Innovation | R&D | Mechanism design | Lizenz | Licence | Patent | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz | Industrial property rights | Industrieforschung | Industrial research |
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