Licensing Requirements as a Coordination Mechanism for Entry

Cheap talk, side payments, and arbitration are limited in their ability to coordinate asymmetric entry among symmetric potential entrants. Externally imposed licensing requirements may provide a viable mechanism to attain the desired asymmetric outcome in equilibrium.

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Year of publication:	2004
Authors:	Shaffer, Sherrill
Published in:	Review of Industrial Organization. - Springer. - Vol. 24.2004, 3, p. 285-299
Publisher:	Springer

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Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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