Lie aversion and self-reporting in optimal law enforcement
Year of publication: |
October 2017
|
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Authors: | Innes, Robert D. |
Published in: |
Journal of regulatory economics. - Norwell, Mass. [u.a.] : Springer, ISSN 0922-680X, ZDB-ID 1027173-9. - Vol. 52.2017, 2, p. 107-131
|
Subject: | Self-reporting | Law enforcement | Lie aversion | Rechtsdurchsetzung | Rechtsökonomik | Economic analysis of law | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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