Livestock Disease Indemnity Design When Moral Hazard is Followed by Adverse Selection
Year of publication: |
2010
|
---|---|
Authors: | Gramig, Ben ; Horan, Richard D. ; Wolf, Christopher A. |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Theorie | Theory | Tierkrankheit | Animal disease | Gesundheitsvorsorge | Preventive care | Subvention | Subsidy |
Description of contents: | Abstract [papers.ssrn.com] |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource |
---|---|
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | In: American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 91, Issue 3, pp. 627-641, August 2009 Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments 2008-11 erstellt Volltext nicht verfügbar |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
-
Livestock disease indemnity design when moral hazard is followed by adverse selection
Gramig, Benjamin M., (2009)
-
Moral hazard in the British bovine tuberculosis control programme
Scheitrum, Daniel P., (2023)
-
Choice in insurance markets : a Pigouvian approach to social insurance design
Hendren, Nathaniel, (2021)
- More ...
-
Estimating Within-Herd Preventive Spillovers in Livestock Disease Management
Gramig, Ben, (2010)
-
Livestock Disease Indemnity Design When Moral Hazard is Followed by Adverse Selection
Gramig, Benjamin M., (2008)
-
Joint management of wildlife and livestock disease
Horan, Richard D., (2008)
- More ...