Loan Guarantees and Guarantors’ Accounting Conservatism : Evidence From China

Listed companies in China have provided large numbers of loan guarantees for borrowers in recent years. The loan guarantee size of A-share Main Board listed companies was about RMB 3.85 trillion at the end of 2017. On the one hand, loan guarantees help borrowers access debt financing, which promotes the development of capital markets. On the other hand, however, loan guarantees can increase the financial risks for guarantors. This study investigates the effects of loan guarantees on guarantors’ accounting conservatism. Based on a large sample of listed companies from 2007 to 2017, we find that loan guarantees have significant positive effects on guarantors’ accounting conservatism. When firms provide loan guarantees for borrowers, they report more conservative accounting information. Moreover, the effect of loan guarantees on accounting conservatism varies by borrower. Listed companies report more conservative accounting information when they provide guarantees for non-subsidiaries rather than for subsidiaries. Among the companies providing guarantees for non-subsidiaries, the companies engage in higher level of accounting conservatism when they guarantee the borrowing of controlling shareholders instead of the borrowing of non-controlling shareholders