Lobbying and the Structure of Protection.
This paper extends the influence- driven model of trade policy determination to include general equilibrium effects on the supply side resulting from labourmarket interaction and intermediate goods. The model's predictions for the structure of protection are related to underlying taste and technology parameters, and we derive analytically several propositions that are consistent with the stylized results of the empirical literature. Finally, numerical simulations are carried out for archetypal "rich" and "poor" economies. It turns out that the endogenously- determined structure of protection is broadly consistent with the observed pattern of protection in rich and poor economies, suggesting the usefulness of the approach.
Year of publication: |
1996
|
---|---|
Authors: | DE, Jaime MELO ; CADOT, Olivier ; OLARREAGA |
Institutions: | Centre d'Études et de Recherches sur le Développement International (CERDI), École d'Économie |
Saved in:
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Can Bilateralism Ease the Pains of Trade Liberalisation ?
DE, Jaime MELO, (1998)
-
Pricing policy under Double Market Power: Madagascar and the International Vanilla Market
DE, Jaime MELO, (1996)
-
How Much Market Access in FTAs? Textiles Under NAFTA
DE, Jaime MELO, (2005)
- More ...